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Dooley: Sounds of Silence on the Civil Jury

SOUNDS OF SILENCE ON THE CIVIL JURY
LAURA GASTON DOOLEY"

INTRODUCTION

Juries are hallowed institutions in our constitutional system. They are
mentioned not once, but three times in the Bill of Rights,' and had been earlier
enshrined in Article III.2 At the heart of our exalted vision of the jury trial is
the sense that juries should be reflective of the community which they are
supposed to represent in the courtroom. 3 Of course, many members of the
relevant community have routinely been excluded from jury service, including
women who comprise more than half of the population. Historically, the
exclusion of women from civil jury service was a systematic and system-wide
practice. Only in the last few decades has it become clear that systematic
exclusion of women from jury pools is unconstitutional. Now the exclusion of

* Assistant Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I thank Laura Mikulski
for her research assistance in the preparation of this essay, and Jennifer Brown, Ian Ayres, Jack
Hiller, Frank Michelman, and Reinhold Dooley for helpful discussions of these issues. I especially
benefitted from insightful comments made by my colleagues JoEllen McGuigan, Bruce Berner and
Ed Gaffney on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V (guaranteeing criminal defendants the right to indictment by grand
juries); amend. VI (right to trial by jury in criminal cases); amend. VII (right to trial by jury in
certain types of civil cases).
2. U.S. CONST. art. III, cl.3.
3. This has been explicitly required in the context of criminal trials by the Supreme Court's
infusion of the notion that juries must be drawn from a "fair cross section" of the community into
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of trial by an impartial jury. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530 (1975)("... the fair-cross-section requirement [is] fundamental to the jury trial right
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment . . . .").

In the exercise of its supervisory power over the

operation of lower federal courts, the Supreme Court has long extolled the virtue of community
representativeness in civil juries:
The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal
or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a crosssection of the community. . . .this does not mean, of course, that every jury must
contain representatives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political and
geographical groups of the community; frequently such complete representation would
be impossible. But it does mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court
officials without systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups.
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible for jury service are to be found
in every stratum of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or
class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury system. To disregard it is to
open the door to class distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the
democratic ideals of trial by jury.
Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)(per Justice Murphy)(striking down jury
selection system that excluded daily wage earners from lists of prospective jurors).
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women is accomplished more surreptitiously, through -the use of peremptory
challenges to members of the jury pool.
But an even more basic exclusion is going on -- one that results from the
continued use of a model of decisionmaking that silences the voices of those who
approach resolution differently from the traditional zero-sum-game of the civil
jury verdict. Put simply, the very nature of the civil jury excludes modes of
thinking that move beyond simple binary solutions. And the exclusion of these
modes of thinking undermines the vision of the civil jury as a body that
represents the community in the courtroom.
This essay briefly traces the history of women's exclusion from
participation in jury service and explains the line of cases which abolished
practices of explicit exclusion while retaining attorneys' ability to control the
representativeness of the final "petit" jury through the use of peremptory
challenges. Next, I briefly review the social science literature that documents
different approaches to problem-solving, approaches that deviate from a
traditional model that assumes the existence of objectively "rational" answers to
moral problems. Influential work throughout the last decade has challenged this
traditional model of moral development, which was largely based on studies of
males only, and which defined the highest stages of moral development in terms
of so-called "rationality" -- the very word we use in law to describe jury
verdicts which survive judicial review. This recent work has shown that
traditional theories fail to account for the "different voice" 4 that is often, though
not exclusively, 5 associated with the approach that women use to resolve moral
dilemmas. The different voice of women manifests a way of thinking that
focuses on relationships, contexts, and responsibilities rather than abstract rules,
isolated situations, and rights.6 This different voice moves beyond the
conventional definition of "rational" as epitomized in abstract, binary results.
It demands a more complex approach to rational decisionmaking, one that
situates problems in real-world contexts and considers a host of solutions.

4. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S

DEvELOPMENT (1982).

5. Gilligan explains that the "different voice" she describes is gender-related rather than genderspecific: "The different voice I describe is characterized not by gender but theme. Its association
with women is an empirical observation, and it is primarily through women's voices that I trace its
development. But this association is not absolute, and the contrasts between male and female voices
are presented here to highlight a distinction between two modes of thought and to focus a problem
of interpretation rather than to represent a generalization about either sex." Id. at 2. See also
Nancy S. Marder, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 605 n.56 (1987)
(citing unpublished Gilligan manuscript for phrases "gender-related" and "gender-specific").
6. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 19; infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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Prevailing myths about jury selection use gender as a proxy for assuming
that prospective jurors are likely to vote a certain way. 7 But a comparison of
that mythology to the reality of the impact of gender on verdicts, measured
empirically by sociologists who study jury behavior, is puzzling. It turns out
that the impact of gender on verdict selection is quite minimal. Moreover,
research shows that women have lower participation rates during the jury
deliberation process. Apparently, the "different voice" of women on civil juries
is not being heard, even when they do survive peremptory challenges. It may
be that the issue of whether or not it's acceptable to use peremptory challenges
to strike women qua women is a red herring. The problem is deeper than the
issue of getting women on to juries. Rather, the very nature of the civil jury
function -- to reach a binary, win/lose solution -- is not one that fits the different
voice described in the psychological literature. Thus, the key issue for the
future of the civil jury as a representative institution is whether, given the
constraints the system places on the jury's ability to determine outcomes of
cases, it can ever be representative of community members, predominantly but
not exclusively women, who refuse to think in terms of zero-sum-games.
The presence, absence or proportion of women on petit juries may not
matter as long as the universe of possibilities for jury verdicts in most cases is
limited to win/lose verdicts.' This rigid system is based on the notion, now
discredited in psychological literature, that abstract rules can be applied by any
discrete group of "rational" jurors9 to reach a verdict that will not vary
according to perspectives or contexts. Thus, the different voice' ° of those
community members who think contextually is drowned out by a system that
operates according to an impoverished understanding of rationality. And the
jury becomes an institution that represents only the segment of the community
whose thinking fits one rigid decisionmaking model.
I. THE SYSTEMATIC EXCLUSION OF WOMEN FROM JURIES AND THE
CONSTITUTION

In 1920, women gained access to the political process through the right to

7. See, e.g., Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE MAGAZINE, May 1936;
MELVIN BELLI, MODERN TRIALS (1954); cited in, REID HASTIE ET. AL, INSIDE THE JURY 122
(1983).
8. Of course, juries sometimes modify this binary structure, in contravention of the jury
instructions given to them, by issuing compromise or quotient verdicts. Those cases may represent
an expression of community dissatisfaction with the basic win/lose structure of most civil jury cases.
9. That jurors are "rational" is a prevailing theme in American law; indeed, when judges
believe that a jury has reached the wrong result in a case and accordingly use their power to set
aside a unanimous verdict, they are required to conclude that no "rational" jury could have reached
that result. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
10. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4.
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vote extended in the Nineteenth Amendment." Despite this victory and despite
a 1946 Supreme Court ruling that women could not be arbitrarily excluded from
federal jury service,'" as late as 1961 the Supreme Court expounded the view
that "woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life." 3 That
was said in the course of approving a state court jury selection system that
excluded women from jury pools unless they took affirmative steps to volunteer
for service. In Taylor v. Louisiana' 4 decided in 1975, the Supreme Court
finally held that jury selection procedures may not require women to take
affirmative steps to serve on juries; such an approach, leading as it does to the
systematic exclusion of women, violates the fair-cross-section requirement of a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Four years later, in
Duren v. Missouri,5 the court held that granting women summoned to serve
on juries an automatic exemption also is a violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement. 6
In the course of these opinions, the Supreme Court was quite eloquent with
regard to the importance of inclusion, specifically the inclusion of women, to
promote the integrity of the jury system:
. . . who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the
community if all men were intentionally and systematically excluded
from the panel? The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a
community made up exclusively of one is different from a community
composed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other
is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from either
may not in a given case make an iota of difference. Yet a flavor, a
distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded.' 7
In the federal system, the presence of women in the pool from which juries
in individual trials are selected (called petit juries) has long been guaranteed by
court decision' and statute.' 9 But the Court has never held that the absence
of that distinct quality contributed by women, whatever it consists of,

11. U.S. CONST. amend XIX (ratified August 18, 1920).
12. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).

13. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961).
14. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

15. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
16. Id. at 370.
.17. Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193-94, quoted in Taylor. 419 U.S. at 531-32. The Taylor Court
further noted that "women bring to juries their own perspectives and values that influence both jury
deliberation and result." 419 U.S. at 532 n.12.
18. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
19. Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1861-1869

(1988)).
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undermines the validity of a jury verdict. In fact, last term the Court made
explicit its view that the fair-cross-section requirement does not extend to the
Thus, the current state of the law is that although it is
petit jury.'
unconstitutional to "stack the deck" 2 by using a system to assemble the jury
pool that excludes a distinct group in the community,' there is no
constitutional requirement that the final jury chosen represent the community in
terms of a makeup of distinct groups that mirrors proportionality in the general
population.' Thus, litigators may use their peremptory challenges to exclude
jury pool members without concern about the proportional representativeness of
the final jury chosen.
The only constitutional limit on litigators' use of peremptory challenges is
the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentuck
that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude African Americans from
petit juries solely on account of their race.? In later cases, the Court made
clear that racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates the Equal
Protection rights of excluded jurors.' To date, the Court has not extended this
protection to jurors excluded because they are women." In fact, the justices
have been careful to distinguish racial discrimination in the selection of petit
juries from other forms of discrimination. Dissenting in the recent case in
which the Supreme Court made clear that the Batson rule applies to civil jury
trials as well as criminal ones, Justice Scalia characterized the rule as
exclusively concerned with race: courts now have "the obligation to assure that
race is not included among the other factors (sex, age, religion, political views,
economic status) used by private parties in exercising their peremptory
Several recent lower courts have been careful to limit the
challenges."2'
Batson Equal Protection argument to racial exclusions. 2' In a decision last
summer, a panel of the Seventh Circuit declared that the Batson requirement "is
limited to the question of racial discrimination, ' prompting Judge Ripple to
note that there had been no need to "definitively and gratuitously [announce] that

20. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
21. The phrase is from the Holland majority, 493 U.S. at 481.
22. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
23. Id. at 364 n.20. Cf.Thiel, supra note 3 at 220 (Justice Murphy extols the importance of
jury representativeness).
24. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
25. Last term, the Court extended the applicability of the Batson rle to civil jury trials in
federal court. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., I l l S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
26. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1990).
27. See United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d 1038 (4th Cir. 1988) (excludingblack women held
not violative of Batson rule).
28. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J.,dissenting).

29. See United States v. Nichols, 937 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1991); Hamilton, supra note 27.
30. Nichols, 937 F.2d at 1262.
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3
the rationale of Batson is not applicable to gender based discrimination." 1

At this point, the future direction of the debate as to the peremptory
challenge is unclear. The tension is between the parties' traditional right to
some control over the makeup of the jury that will decide their case and the
obvious potential for discriminatory use. The use of the peremptory challenge
to accomplish outright exclusion of women from petit juries is obviously
troublesome. In the next section, however, I posit that the exclusion may
continue even when women are seated on petit juries. If so, then our focus has
to move beyond the peremptory challenge debate to a reevaluation of the civil
jury as an institution.
II.

DIFFERENT VoicES AND THE

ZERO-SUM-GAME

OF THE CIVIL JURY

VERDICr

The notion that men and women think differently and approach problemsolving in different ways is not new.' What is new is a willingness to view the
moral thinking of women as different and valuable rather than inferior or
immature. Carol Gilligan is largely responsible for this new respect for an
alternative mode of thinking largely associated with women. Her 1982 book,
In a Different Voice, undertook to demonstrate that moral development theorists
had failed to account for the fact that women tend to construe moral problems
differently: "The disparity between women's experience and the representation
of human development, noted throughout the psychological literature, has
generally been seen to signify a problem in women's development. Instead, the
failure of women to fit existing models of human growth may point to a problem
in the representation, a limitation in the conception of human condition, an
omission of certain truths about life."33
My argument grows out of this basic insight: the civil jury is an institution
that privileges abstract rule application as the best method for resolving disputes.
Thus, civil juries are required in most cases to play a zero-sum-game. They are
told they must either decide that defendant wins, in which case plaintiff loses,
or that plaintiff wins, in which case defendant loses. This sort of thinking,
focused on exclusively binary solutions, is a nearly perfect fit with the so-called
higher stages of moral development described in traditional models, which

31. Id. at 1264 (Ripple, I., concurring).
32. See Susan Moller Okin, Thinking Like a Woman, in THEORETiCAL. PEiSPEc'ivEs ON
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE (Deborah Rhode, ed., 1990). Okin traces the uniformly unpleasant history
of this notion from Plato through Hegel, Bentham and Freud to modern scholars of moral
development like Kohlberg, emphasizing that all viewed women's moral thinking as inferior to
men's. Id. at 145-49.
33. GILUGAN, supra note 4 at 19.
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typically used males as their standard for tracing the development of moral
thought from childhood through adolescence to adulthood.
Early this century, Jean Piaget studied children at play, and concluded that
morality develops as children learn respect for rules by playing rule-bound
Piaget noted differences between little girls and little boys in their
games.'
play. Girls have a more tolerant, pragmatic attitude toward rules; they are more
open to rule changes and willing to recognize needed exceptions.' Boys, on
the other hand, seem fascinated with the legal aspect of their game playing and
From this
in developing procedures for resolving the disputes that arise.'
in
little
girls
than in
that
the
legal
sense
"is
far
less
developed
Piaget concluded
boys." 37 In the 1960s, moral development theorist Lawrence Kohlberg
hypothesized that the moral and legal lessons children learn through play are a
product of role-playing. Traditional girls' games, like hopscotch and jumprope,
differ from traditional boys' games in that they are not directly competitive each child has her opportunity in turn to play.' Significantly, there is no need
for winners and losers to be declared.
Kohlberg went on to describe moral development, based on studies
exclusively of males, 39 as progressing through six hierarchical stages.'
Gilligan describes the lowest two Kohlberg stages as involving choices made
according to "an egocentric understanding of fairness based on individual
need;" 4' the middle two levels as "a conception of fairness anchored in the
shared conventions of societal agreement," and the highest two levels as "a
principled understanding of fairness that rests on the free-standing logic of
equality and reciprocity."'

34. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 10 (explaining work of Jean Piaget and its impact on our
understanding of the moral development of boys and girls).
35. Id.
36. This idea was advanced in later research done by Janet Lever. See GILLIGAN, supra note
4, at 10.
37. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 10, citing JEAN PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE
CHILD 77 (1932).
38. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 10 (describing Kohlberg's work).
39. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and of Morality,
47 HARVARD EDUCATIONAL REvIEW 481-517 (1977); Okin, supra note 31, at 149.
40. LAWRENCE KOHLBERo, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT: MORAL STAGES AND
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 17-19 (1981); See also Lawrence Kohlberg and R. Kramer, Continuities and

Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development, 12 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 93-120
(1969) [hereinafter Kohlberg and Kramer].
41. See Okin, supra note 31, at 149: "The first [of Kohlberg's stages] considers the avoidance
of punishment. The second is characterized by the notion 'I'll scratch your back if you'll scratch
mine."
42. GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 27.
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Though Kohlberg's original database consisted exclusively of males, later
studies involving women showed that many more adult women than men are at
level three on the scale, in which "Behavior is frequently judged by intention -the judgment 'he means well' becomes important for the first time. One earns
approval by being 'nice.' ' 43
Gilligan explains this stage as morality
"conceived in interpersonal terms and [in which] goodness is equated with
helping and pleasing others.'"' Kohlberg himself concluded from this finding
that adult morality is a function of socialization rather than development, and
that stage three is a "functional morality for housewives and mothers" who made
up a large percentage of the women studied.'
What happens when these purportedly immature decisionmakers are called
to jury service? Professor Okin notes that "since Kohlberg argues that our
society is progressing toward the highest and most liberal stages of moral
reasoning, it seems strange that he does not concern himself with the half of the
adult population that seems to constitute something of an obstacle in the way of
such progress, being socialized for a sex role that requires a stage of moral
thinking that men pass through or bypass in late childhood."'
The early common-law system prized the close interaction of human stories
and moral reasoning and the lay members of the jury played a crucial role in
marking the point of interaction between law and the lives of those who came
before the court. But as the law began to privilege abstract rule application as
the best method for resolving disputes, juries became agents for implementing
an impoverished notion of abstract rationality. Thus, our civil juries now are
expected to follow the law, to not be swayed by empathy or sympathy, and
above all to be "rational.'"7 In fact, "rationality"' is the touchstone by
which we measure a jury's performance. It is only when the trial judge
concludes that no reasonable or rational jury could have reached the verdict

43. KOHLBERG, supra note 40, at 18; 147-68.
44. GILLIOAN, supra note 4, at 18.
45. Kohlberg & Kramer, supra note 40, at 108, cited in Okin,supra note 31, at 150. Kohlberg
and Kramer apparently believed that when women enter spheres that are traditionally male, they will
progress to the higher stages. See GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 18.
46. Okin, supra note 32, at 150.
47. See, e.g., EDWARD J.DEvrrr, CtARLES B. BLACKMAR & MICHAEL A. WOLFF,FEDERAL
JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS Sec. 71.01 (General Introduction - Province of the Court and

Jury)(1987).
48. The quote marks around the words rational and rationality are meant to convey my view
that the terms have been coopted in the legal literature to connote a type of abstract decisionmaking
that is off the mark from a proper definition of the terms. Indeed, one could better conclude that
a more "rational" decision may be reached when more contextual information is considered.
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actually returned that he" is permitted to set the verdict aside.-' Presumably,
the jury members best able to fulfill that role, to be rational decisionmakers, are
those people who have moved past stage three, where many women are, and
have reached at least stage four on the Kohlberg scale. At stage four, the
thinker becomes legalistic; decisions are made with a view toward obedience to
the law and respect for authority. 5' A later researcher applying Kohlberg's
scale observed that stage four reasoning is not "compatible with the traditionally
expressive female role" while stage three "is not compatible with the
traditionally instrumental American male role."'
Here, the intersection
between empiricism and jury function becomes very problematic: if we expect
our juries to perform a decisionmaking function that mirrors stage four and up
thinking, then the logical conclusion is that those with a different approach usually women -- should be excluded from civil juries.
Carol Gilligan's work is at the forefront of challenges to this conventional
description of women's moral thinking. The "different voice" she describes is not stuck at halfway up the Kohlberg ladder. It is a voice that thinks in terms
Kohlberg's ladder does not even contemplate. This voice is "contextual and
narrative rather than formal and abstract,"" and conceives moral development
as the "understanding of responsibility and relationships, just as the conception
of morality as fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and
rules."' In terms that mirror legal language about the role of civil juries,
Gilligan notes that "whereas the rights conception of morality that informs
Kohlberg's principled level (stages five and six) is geared to arriving at an

49. The use of the male pronoun here is quite intentional. Given that the majority of judges
are men, the application of a standard based on 'rationality" to judge the quality of a jury's
performance might be especially troubling.
50. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) & (b)(as amended effective December 1, 1991)("If during a
trial by jury a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient
evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect to that issue, the
court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party ... (b) Such a motion
may be renewed by service and filing not later than 10 days after entry of judgment [upon jury
verdict]."). In criminal cases, the standard explicitly centers on the "rationality" of the jury verdict.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)(conviction may be upheld only ifs rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.").
51. Okin, supra note 32, at 149.
52. Constance B. Holstein, Irreversible, Stepwise Sequence in the Development of Moral
Judgment: A LongitudinalStudy of Males and Females, 47 CHILD DEVELOPMENT 51, 59 (1976).
In so concluding, Professor Holstein argued that this finding, together with data that measured the
liberality of the subjects studied, indicated that Kohlberg's system privileges cognitive thinking and
fails to consider "morally relevant emotions such as compassion, sympathy, and love. ..
I"
d. at
61.
53. GILuAN, supra note 4, at 19.
54. Id. at 19.
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objectively fair or just resolution to moral dilemmas upon which all rational"
persons could agree, the responsibility conception focuses instead on the
limitations of any particular resolution and describes the conflicts that
remain."'
Here the law's impoverished definition of rationality comes into
focus. Dissatisfaction with abstract win/lose solutions to problems that come up
in the real world certainly seems far from irrational 7 - by seeking results that
reflect a larger contextual picture, the different voice of women enlarges the
potential for just decisionmaking in legal disputes.
The question we can now pose is this: is the "flavor", the "distinct
quality" that the Supreme Court says we lose when we exclude women from
jury pools the "different voice" described by Gilligan? If so, does the
distinctiveness that women bring translate into results that look different at the
end of trials?
Here another set of empirical data becomes significant. Sociologists who
study jury behavior have analyzed the impact of gender on jury verdicts. They
have been unable to document any difference between male and female verdict
preferences in either criminal or civil cases.' In light of the correspondence
drawn above between so-called "male" patterns of decisionmaking and the civil
jury function, this empiricism might be interpreted in one of two ways. It may
be that women rise to the occasion, so to speak, when serving on juries, and
become stage four and up thinkers,' at least for the moment.
Or it could be that women's different voice is silenced by the structure of
the verdict reaching process. Empirical research would tend to support the latter
interpretation. Studies show that male jurors speak proportionately more often
that female jurors, making up to forty percent more comments.60 Male jurors
are also more likely than female jurors to be elected foreperson, a role that is
often critical in the jury room dynamics.6 It has been suggested that because

55. Here again the language describing "male" decisionmaking tracks legal descriptions of the
civil jury's function.
56. GILLIGAN, supra note 4, at 21-22.

57. To the contrary, we should be suspicious of any system that uses abstract, formalistic
thinking to solve real-world problems.
58. REID HASTIE Err AL., supra note 7, at 140-41. The authors catalog the major studies and

note that no gender differences were found in either student or citizen jury simulations.
59. This would comport with Kohlberg's assumption, as described by Gilligan, that "if women

enter the traditional arena of male activity [they will] recognize the inadequacy of [their] moral
perspective and progress like men toward higher stages where relationships are subordinated to rules
(stage four) and nles to universal principles ofjustice (stages five and six)." GILlIGAN, suapra note
4, at 18.
60. See HASTIE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 145-46; see generally Nancy S. Marder, Gender
Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593 (1987).
61. See Marder, supra note 60 at 595 n.9 (surveying empirical literature).
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women on juries are often outnumbered by men, they may fall back on
traditional sex roles, a problem easily solved by increasing numbers of
women.' But the relative silence of women on juries may indicate a larger
problem with the jury system - namely, that there is no room on the jury for
thinking that goes beyond simple binary "you win/I lose" results.
Professor Menkel-Meadow has observed that the female voices described
by Gilligan "have trouble judging disputes in a male-created context because of
their difficulty in perceiving one right answer ....
"' Like Portia in
Shakespeare's Merchant of Venice, who disguised herself as a male to make a
legal argument focused on mercy rather than justice," Menkel-Meadow posits
that women in the legal profession will demand a reexamination of the utility of
the adversarial system as a whole, with increasing focus on alternative methods
of dispute resolution. She describes the litigation process as "relatively similar
[and not coincidentally] to a sporting event - there are rules, a referee, an
object to the game, and a winner is declared after the play is over."
She
notes that the game model plays out not just in the courtroom, but also in the
way lawyers plan, negotiate, and advise their clients.'
As to the function of
the jury in the game, she apparently sees it as a beacon of hope: she asks
"Does the use of a jury provide a useful framework for a kind ofjudging where
no single perception of the truth must prevail, but where a verdict is the product
of a mediated consensus?"'
Given the current use of civil juries, the answer to that question, I fear, is
no. The civil jury's role in litigation is to referee the facts and decide which
party should win the zero-sum-game. The verdict they render is a sort of
scoreboard. Like the boys at play in Piaget's study, they must decide in favor
of one party and against the other, thereby keeping the litigational ball in play.
The jury is instructed that it may not function like the little girls at play, by
reconsidering the rules in the context and suggesting innovative solutions. As
far as the civil jury is concerned, no other possibilities for resolution exist. In
fact, if the jurors cannot agree that one party should win, the jury is said to be
"hung" - and before a judge will allow the trial to end in such a stalemate he
will send the jury back to deliberate again and again -- sudden death
decisionmaking.

62. See ROsABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 208 (1977) cited in

MARDER, supra note 59, at 597 n.20.
63. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Differem Voice:

Speculations on a Women's

Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL 39, 59 (1985).
64. Id. at 42 n.23, citing WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, Act IV, Scene
I, reprinted in THE COMPLETE SIGNET CLASSIC SHAKESPEARE 630 (S. Bamet ed., 1963).
65. Id. at 51.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 59.
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The rigidity of the system may best explain the relative silence of women
on civil juries. And if the distinctive flavor that women supposedly bring to the
civil jury has anything to do with a different, more contextual and responsibilityoriented method of problem-solving, then simply increasing numbers of women
on civil juries (by limiting peremptory challenges) is not the sole answer.

III.

THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT,

REPRESENTATIVENESS,

AND THE

PossIBILITY OF CONTEXTUAL JUSTICE

So what does all this mean for our celebration of the Bicentennial of the
Seventh Amendment? The answer turns, I think, on what we want from our
civil juries. If the constitutionally guaranteed right to a civil jury trial means
that we value the participation of the community in the resolution of disputes
between two private parties, and if that in turn reflects a judgment that a
communitarian model of dispute resolution is superior to having a single legallytrained judge decide private disputes, then the question becomes whether we
should be satisfied with a system so rigid that it drowns but the voices of
perhaps a majority of the community.
Of course, the civil jury developed and was enshrined in the Seventh
Amendment during a time when men were the sole players in the courtroom
game. The spare history of the incorporation of the civil jury trial guarantee
into the Bill of Rights indicates that our forebears generally agreed on the need
for civil juries as a check on potentially corrupt judges, and that the general
language of the amendment reflects both that basic concern and the concomitant
lack of concern about the precise nature of the right.' To say that the drafters
could not have dreamed of changing the basic win/lose structure of the civil jury
trial is probably accurate, but it is no less true that they did not envision other
modem modifications, such as the division of authority between judge and
jury.' The point is that by confining the role of civil jurors to reaching only
zero-sum-game results, we are not fully implementing the vision of community
participation that is at the heart of the civil jury guarantee. To the contrary, we
are undermining the communitarian function by our continued use of a rigid
system that demonstrably squelches the voice of a large and important segment
of the community.

68. See generally Edith G. Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 289 (1966).
69. See generally id.; see also Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A
Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making, 70 N.W. U. L. REv. 486, 487 (1975)(The
Supreme Court "has attempted to accomplish the original broad purposes of the [seventh] amendment
by taking into account how changed circumstances and conditions affect the accomplishment of those
purposes.").
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As explained above, the Supreme Court has consistently expressed the view
that juries cannot fulfill their constitutionally protected functions when they are
not selected from a pool that fairly reflects the community. My argument here
makes a parallel point: the final verdict reached in any given civil jury case
may not fairly reflect the kind of community input that the very existence of the
civil jury was supposed to ensure.
If the structure of the civil jury trial is so basically flawed, then is there a
future for the civil jury? That can be answered with a resounding yes. If we
understand the purpose of the Seventh Amendment to ensure community
participation in the resolution of private disputes, then one can imagine many
formats that would facilitate that kind of participation. Obviously, modes of
dispute resolution must be calibrated to the substance of the dispute. For some
types of cases, one can imagine a civil jury functioning as a sort of collective
mediating body, a role that would require much greater latitude during the
courtroom proceedings for direct juror interaction with parties and attorneys,
now largely forbidden. But even without such fundamental changes in the way
trials are conducted, great progress could be made simply by expanding the
choices available to juries in their decisionmaking process. An accepted version
of this goes on already in comparative negligence cases, in which the jury is
asked to compare and quantify the relative fault of the parties.
Professor Kenneth Karst has proposed that the sort of moral thinking
described by Gilligan could inform constitutional debates on a doctrinal level.'
He notes that "[i]n constitutional litigation, as elsewhere, a look at the human
context in which legal relations are embedded may alter our sense of justice in
a particular case." 7 My proposal is that we reevaluate the trial process, and
more particularly the function of the civil jury, to see whether it might be
modified to accommodate approaches to dispute resolution that focus on
contextual justice. In light of our more sophisticated understanding of ourselves,
it seems appropriate that we re-structure the civil jury to manifest more than just
one abstract, rules-based approach to decisionmaking.
CONCLUSION

The presence of women on juries is a relatively recent phenomenon.7
The jurisprudence of inclusion with regard to jury service has developed in two
doctrinal strands - the requirement that the jury be drawn from a fair cross
section of the community and the Equal Protection limit on the use of

70. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 499.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
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peremptory challenges.' In developing this jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
has extolled the distinct flavor that women can bring to the jury room. At the
same time, psychologists who study women's thinking' have documented an
approach to decisionmaking that goes beyond abstract application of rules and
seeks to enlarge the possibilities for resolution beyond simple binary
solutions.' 5 I have argued that the future of the civil jury requires bringing
these two disciplines together. The simple goal of placing women on juries,
laudable though it is, does not go far enough in manifesting the Seventh
Amendment vision of community participation in private dispute resolution. As
long as the system requires the civil jury to play a zero-sum-game, the different
voice of jurors who think of more creative resolution possibilities wili not be
heard. Our tradition of placing unnecessary limits on the resolution possibilities
available to juries is itself a choice to privilege a particular model of
decisonmaking primarily associated with only one segment of the community.
The jury does not fully represent a fair-cross-section of the community when its
very structure silences the voices of perhaps the largest group within it.

73. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
74. Again, it is important to stress that this is not an exclusively female phenomenon. See
supra note 5. All community members who think in the "different voice" described in the
psychological literature may suffer exclusion from civil jury participation.
75. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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